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The Coordination and Design of
Point-Nonpoint Trading Programs
and Agri-Environmental Policies
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Agricultural agencies have long offered agri-environmental payments that are inadequate to achieve
water quality goals, and many state water quality agencies are considering point-nonpoint trading to
achieve the needed pollution reductions. This analysis considers both targeted and nontargeted agri-
environmental payment schemes, along with a trading program which is not spatially targeted. The
degree of improved performance among these policies is found to depend on whether the programs
are coordinated or not, whether double-dipping (i.e., when farmers are paid twice—once by each
program—to undertake particular pollution control actions) is allowed, and whether the agri-environ-
mental payments are targeted. Under coordination, efficiency gains only occur with double-dipping,
so that both programs jointly influence farmers’ marginal decisions. Without coordination, double-
dipping may increase or decrease efficiency, depending on how the agri-environmental policy is
targeted. Finally, double-dipping may not solely benefit farmers, but can result in a transfer of agri-
cultural subsidies to point sources.
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Reducing water pollution from agricultural produc-
tion has become a leading priority of federal and
state agencies charged with water quality protection
[U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA), 1998].
Water quality assessments show agriculture to be a
major, but largely unregulated cause of water pollu-
tion problems. It has become clear that achieving
water quality goals in many regions of the nation
will require significant reductions in pollution loads
from agricultural sources (USEPA, 2000). More-
over, reliance on point source pollution controls to
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achieve water quality improvements in regions
where agriculture and other nonpoint sources are
significant contributors to water quality impairments
increases the costs of environmental protection by
precluding efficient allocation of control between
point and nonpoint sources (Freeman, 1990).
Among the most important EPA initiatives to
address agriculture’s contributions to water quality
problems now is the Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) program, which requires states to develop
and implement watershed-based plans for surface
waters that do not meet water quality standards.
Essentially, the TMDL program requires states to
identify the total pollution load reductions needed
to achieve water quality standards in impaired
waters, and to allocate the reductions among point
and nonpoint sources (USEPA, 2004). Achieving
standards will require agricultural nonpoint source
pollution control in watersheds where agriculture is
a significant cause of water quality impairments.
An important feature of EPA’s TMDL program
is that it provides states with substantial freedom
for selecting policy instruments. Pollution trading
is emerging as an appealing option. The growing
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dissatisfaction with traditional command-and-control
approaches has led to substantial interest by state
authorities and the EPA in the use of incentive-
based mechanisms, with particular interest in pollu-
tion trading between point and nonpoint sources, as
a means to strengthen nonpoint pollution controls
and to enhance the coordination of point and non-
point source controls (Elmore, Jaksch, and Downing,
1985; USEPA, 2001; USDA and USEPA, 1998;
Great Lakes Trading Network, 2000; Faeth, 2000).
Several fully implemented and pilot trading pro-
grams have been in operation for some time (Horan,
2001), and in January 2003, the USEPA announced
rules for a national program, with funding for 11
pilot programs throughout the nation (USEPA,
2003).
In “textbook” form, point-nonpoint trading works
as follows. Each pollution source is allocated pollu-
tion permits defining the permit holder’s allowable
emissions (for point sources) or estimated emissions
(for nonpoint sources). Through trades, polluters
can adjust their allowances by buying permits from
or selling permits to other permit holders subject to
rules governing trades (i.e., a trading ratio which
defines how many nonpoint source permits trade
for one point source permit). The gains from trade
correspond to reductions in overall pollution control
costs, as trading encourages a least-cost allocation
of load reductions among sources.
It should be noted that U.S. trading programs have
evolved with enforceable regulations applicable to
point sources, while agriculture’s participation is
made voluntary by essentially giving agricultural
sources a presumptive right to pollute at historical
levels (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997). This alloca-
tion of rights should not affect the ability to attain
particular environmental outcomes efficiently, pro-
vided the total number of permits and the trading
rules are defined appropriately. For instance, trading
may not improve the environmental outcome if
point source permit numbers remain fixed when
trading is implemented, but the outcome would
improve if the trading program was implemented
along with a reduction in point source permits. In
that case, additional controls on both sources could
emerge. Making trading voluntary for agricultural
sources does affect the distribution of costs and
benefits. Farmers who participate would be paid to
do so, and thus trading represents a source of
potential income to them. Point sources are the sole
purchasers of permits under such a setup, but their
costs are still less than what they would incur if
they undertook all abatement responsibilities.
Theoretical and numerical analysis of point-non-
point trading has focused largely on the design of
the optimal trading ratio between point and non-
point sources (e.g., Shortle, 1987; Malik, Letson,
and Crutchfield, 1993; Horan, 2001). Without
exception, studies of trading examine program
design and the gains from trade independent of the
presence and design of other policies that have an
impact on nonpoint pollution loads—trading is
examined as a stand-alone approach to achieving
pollution reductions. This assumption is limiting in
practice. Given the various federal and state agri-
environmental payment programs offered to subsi-
dize soil and water conservation, and water quality
protection practices, trading program development
occurs in a context in which there are existing,
although not notably effective, policies (Ribaudo,
2001). Farmers’ incentives to participate in point-
nonpoint trading programs, and the effects of such
programs on resource allocation, will be affected by
simultaneous opportunities to participate in agri-
environmental payment programs. And the converse
is true.
Accordingly, questions emerge about the bene-
fits of coordinating the two types of programs, and
also the design of policy parameters—whether or
not coordination occurs. Presumably the environ-
ment and society are better off with coordination,
but is agriculture better off? Also, how is the allo-
cation of controls across watersheds affected by
coordination?
To address these questions, the design of policy
parameters must be considered. We focus signifi-
cantly on two particular policy choices. The first is
whether or not agricultural sources can collect pay-
ments from two programs for the same environ-
mentally beneficial activity, referred to here as
“double-dipping.” This choice is of particular
relevance because farmer participation has been
voluntary for both USDA programs and point-
nonpoint trading programs. If double-dipping is
allowed, then each program cross-subsidizes the
other, and farmers’ marginal abatement costs are
reduced relative to what would emerge under either
program individually. If double-dipping is not
allowed, then one program essentially taxes the
ability of the other to produce environmental gains.
For instance, a farmer might first enroll in the
USDA program where some level of abatement
effort is subsidized. The farmer can then participate
in the trading program, but only for additional units
of abatement effort. These additional units of effort
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if abatement costs are increasing in abatement effort.
The ability to double-dip could therefore affect
participation, and hence program performance and
distributional outcomes.
The second policy choice examined in this analy-
sis is the trading ratio. This choice will be affected
by whether coordination occurs and whether double-
dipping is allowed.
We begin with a conceptual model of agri-envi-
ronmental payments and point-nonpoint trading.
The conceptual model allows us to derive some
interesting results about the merits of double-
dipping and policy coordination, and implications
for the design of trading ratios. This model does not
indicate the potential magnitudes of gains from
double-dipping or coordination, or the optimal trad-
ing ratio, the sensitivity of the trading ratio to the
design of the agri-environmental payments, or
nuances of the distributional outcomes. These are
empirical issues. Insight about these issues can be
gained only through numerical analysis. Results on
these issues are presented using a simulation model
of nitrogen pollution control in the Susquehanna
River Basin (SRB), an important source of nutrient
loads for the Chesapeake Bay. More will be said
about the SRB and related nitrogen pollution prob-
lems below.
A Model of Point Source and Agricultural
Nonpoint Source Pollution
Building on the model of Shortle, Horan, and Abler
(1998), assume a particular resource (e.g., an estu-
ary) is damaged by a single residual (e.g., nitrogen).
Economic damages, D, are an increasing function
of the ambient concentration of the residual, a, i.e.,
D(a) with DN > 0. Ambient pollution depends on
loadings from nonpoint sources, ri (i ' 1, ..., n);
point source discharges, ek (k ' 1, ..., s); natural gen-
eration of the pollutant, ξ; and stochastic environ-
mental variables that influence transport and fate, δ:
a ' a(r1, ..., rn; e1, ..., es; ξ, δ),
Ma/Mri, Ma/Mei $ 0 œi.
For heuristic purposes, denote point source (PS)
polluters as firms that generate emissions (although
many relevant point sources are not firms, but rather
municipal wastewater treatment facilities), and de-
note nonpoint source (NPS) polluters as farms that
generate pollution loadings. The term “farm” is
used for heuristic purposes and because agriculture
is the primary target of current U.S. point-nonpoint
trading markets (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997) due
to agriculture’s role as the leading contributor of
polluted runoff.
Emissions are observable and nonstochastic.
1
Loadings cannot be observed directly (at an accept-
able cost) because they are diffuse and, via stochastic
variations in environmental drivers (e.g., weather),
they are also stochastic. The relation for site i is ri '
ri(xi, vi), where xi is an {m × 1} vector of variable
inputs (with jth element xij), and vi represents site-
specific, stochastic environmental variables. Accord-
ingly, farms can only influence the distribution of
their loadings through their input choices. These
choices would include both standard production
decisions (e.g., land allocated to particular crops,
fertilizer and pesticide use, tillage practices) and
also practices undertaken specifically to control pol-
lution (e.g., buffer strips).
The costs of reducing emissions have been treated
extensively in the literature (see Baumol and Oates,
1988; Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997). Conven-
tionally, costs are treated as an increasing function
of the level of emissions reduction, or abatement.
Following this convention, we define the kth firm’s
expected pollution control costs to be a function of
abatement, denoted ek0 ! ek, where ek0 is some base
level of emissions. Given that ek0 is a constant, nota-
tion is simplified by defining abatement costs as
a function of emissions A cek(ek), (cek N <0 ,cek O$0).
deterministic abatement cost function of this type is
inappropriate for farms due to the diffuse and
stochastic features of loadings (Shortle and Dunn,
1986; Shortle, 1990). Instead, control costs are
defined as a function of the input choices farmers
make to influence the distribution of their loadings,
i.e., cri(xi).
2
An ex ante efficient allocation of pollution
control efforts minimizes the sum of private control
costs and expected damage costs:
3
1  Point emissions are in fact often measured with error and subject to
stochastic influences. Nevertheless, this treatment is standard and helps
to contrast the typical theoretical treatment of point sources with nonpoint
sources.
2  This cost of pollution control activities is by definition the reduction
in economic returns the farmer would incur relative to the case where the
farmer is maximizing economic returns without pollution controls (Free-
man, 1993), i.e., cri(xi) = πr
u
i ! πri(xi), where πr
u
i represents maximized
economic returns in the unregulated environment, and πri(xi) denotes
the economic returns to the ith farm, restricted on the vector of input
choices, x.
3  With ex ante efficiency, pollution allocations and policies to achieve
these allocations are deemed efficient in expectation, before the realiza-
tion of stochastic variables. In contrast, ex post efficiency would require
allocations to be efficient after the realization of stochastic variables. Ex
ante efficient allocations are not likely to be ex post efficient, but ex ante
efficiency is the correct criterion under expected utility theory when
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Condition (1) states that the marginal private bene-
fits from using polluting inputs (i.e., the marginal
reduction in control costs) should equal the associ-
ated marginal expected damages, and the marginal
private costs of using abating inputs should equal
the associated expected marginal external benefits
(i.e., the expected marginal reduction in damages).
Condition (2) states that the marginal private bene-
fits of emissions (i.e., the marginal reduction in
control costs) should equal the marginal expected
damages of emissions [see Shortle and Abler (1997)
for a more detailed description of these well-known
conditions]. We now turn to the policy mechanisms
used by the two agencies.
Agricultural Conservation Policies
Agricultural conservation policies are modeled as
input-based subsidies which are utilized to reduce
loadings.
4 Basing these subsidies on inputs is con-
sistent with existing agri-environmental programs,
such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Pro-
gram (EQIP) and Conservation Security Program
(CSP), in which payments are based on nutrient
management or other production and/or land use
practices (Claassen et al., 2001).
5
Input subsidies are defined as:
max sij(x
U
ij & xij), 0 ,
where sij is the per unit subsidy rate applied to the
use of input j by farm i, and is the farmer’s cost- x
U
ij
minimizing (baseline) level of input j in the unregu-
lated outcome [i.e., consistent with setting / (Mcri)
( If sij > 0, then the subsidy is to Mxij)'0, œ i, j].
reduce the use of polluting inputs. If sij < 0, then the
subsidy is to increase the use of abating inputs. Ex
ante efficient rates would be farm-specific and set
equal to the right-hand side of equation (1), evalu-
ated at the optimum. While we allow for the subsidy
rate to be farm-specific, in practice rates may be
applied uniformly at least on a regional basis to
reduce transactions costs.
A Point-Nonpoint Trading Market
Point-nonpoint trading is fundamentally different
from “textbook” tradeable discharge permit markets
involving only point sources (Shortle, 1987; Malik,
Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993). Two fundamental
design issues or questions arise when nonpoint
sources are added to the mix. One question is: What
is the appropriate legal entitlement, or property
right, that would be transferred through trades be-
tween point and nonpoint sources? In conventional
permit markets, such as those for S02 permits,
pollution permits define allowable emissions for the
permit holder, and firms can adjust their allowances
by buying from or selling to other permit holders,
subject to rules governing trades. However, actual
loadings cannot be directly traded because they
cannot be accurately monitored at reasonable cost
and they have a significant random component
(Letson, 1992; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield,
1993; Shortle, 1987). Accordingly, an alternative
basis for nonpoint trades is required. The option we
consider entails trading changes in emissions for
changes in estimated or expected loadings. In this
case, data on agricultural land uses, and geophysical
and climatic factors are input into models (e.g.,
SWAT or AGNPS) which estimate loads. Existing
point-nonpoint trading programs are of this emis-
sions-for-expected loadings type (Hoag and Hughes-
Popp, 1997; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993;
Shortle and Abler, 1997).
6
4  Agricultural conservation policies come in a variety of forms to
address the various linkages between agriculture and the environment,
such as nonpoint pollution, soil erosion, and the provision of wildlife hab-
itat and rural amenities. For the present study, we ignore the multifunc-
tionalilty of agriculture and instead focus on policies designed to confront
a single problem—nonpoint pollution.
5  As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, 60% of EQIP dollars go
to livestock operations, which are considered point sources for National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System purposes. For simplicity, we are
ignoring livestock in the current model and focusing instead on industrial
point sources that do not receive agricultural subsidies. The Tar-Pamlico
trading program provides one precedent of a point-nonpoint trading
program where there is a differentiation between industrial point sources
and livestock point sources, i.e., a trading ratio of 3:1 between cropland
and industrial point sources and a ratio of 2:1 between livestock and
industrial point sources (Hoag and Hughes-Popp, 1997).
6  Plausible alternative bases include management practices (e.g., BMPs)
that influence nonpoint loads. See Horan, Shortle, and Abler (2002) and
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A second question arising when nonpoint sources
are included is: At what rate should trades occur?
Emissions and expected loads are imperfect substi-
tutes. Consequently, water quality goals may not be
achieved or maintained if emissions and expected
loads are traded one-for-one. A potential solution is
to require that trades occur according to a “trading
ratio” which defines the required reduction in
expected loads for a one-unit increase in emissions
(e.g., Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993; Shortle,
1987). Trading ratios are used in practice (see
Horan, 2001, table 1), although there is no evidence
to suggest the chosen ratios promote efficiency.
We now consider an emissions-for-expected
loadings trading system, given that conservation
programs are already in place, and making the
common assumption that the permit market is
perfectly competitive (e.g., Montgomery, 1972;
Hanley, Shogren, and White, 1997). The discussion
begins with some details of the market and an
examination of how firm/farm behavior will occur
in a perfectly competitive trading equilibrium. This
behavior is then used to examine the optimal choice
of policy parameters for this market.
There are two categories of permits: emissions
permits (e ˆ) and loadings permits (r ˆ). Firms must
have a combination of both types at least equal to
their emissions, and farms must have a combination
at least equal to their expected loadings. We assume
1:1 trading of permits within source categories,
with trading ratios applicable for trades between
categories. The cross-category trading ratio is
denoted t—i.e., t ' *dˆ r/dˆ e*.
The restriction of 1:1 trading within categories is
analogous to many existing trading systems and
allows us to focus on trading between rather than
within source categories. However, it also implies
certain inefficiencies. Specifically, 1:1 trading with-
in a source category means emissions (expected
loadings) by a firm (farm) close to the estuary are
considered perfect substitutes for emissions
(expected loadings) by a firm (farm) located very
far away from the estuary, even though a smaller
proportion of pollutants generated farther away
actually reaches the estuary. Efficiency is reduced
if pollutants are treated as perfect substitutes when
they have differential marginal environmental im-
pacts (McGartland and Oates, 1985; Montgomery,
1972; Tietenberg, 1995).
7
Denote the market price of expected loadings per-
mits as pr, and the price of emissions permits as pe.
Firm k will choose emissions levels, emissions
permit holdings (e ˆk), and expected loadings permit
holdings (r ˆk) to minimize costs,
Jk ' cek(ek) % pe ˆ ek& ˆ ek0 % pr ˆ rk& ˆ rk0 ,
subject to the constraint that its total emissions are
less than its permit holdings, where ek# ˆ ek% (1/t)ˆ rk,
e ˆk0 and r ˆk0 are initial emissions and expected
loadings permits held by firm k, respectively, and
(1/t)r ˆk represents the emissions it is permitted to
generate based on its holdings of expected loadings
permits.
Assuming the emissions constraint is satisfied as
an equality and, without loss of generality, assuming
r ˆk0 ' 0, e ˆk can be eliminated as a choice variable.

















Given indifference between emissions and expected
loadings permits at the margin in a competitive
market equilibrium, (3) is satisfied as an equality,
implying t ' pe/pr. Using this relation and substitut-
ing the permit constraint into the objective function,
we have Jk' cek(ek) % pe[ek& ˆ ek0].
Similarly, farms will choose inputs, expected
loadings permit holdings (r ˆi), and emissions permit
holdings (e ˆi) to minimize costs. Assuming, as in
existing trading programs, that farms do not initially
hold emissions permits, and following the methods
used above for firms, it is easy to show farm i’s net





ij &xij &pr ˜ ri0&E{ri(xi)} ,
where r ˜i0 represents the number of permits the
farmer is allowed to sell to firms. The number of
permits the farmer is allowed to sell may differ
from the farm’s initial endowment of permits (r ˆi0),
depending on whether double-dipping is allowed—
that is, if the farmer can receive payments from both
the conservation and trading programs to undertake
the same activities. Note, the farmer’s net costs will
be negative if the farmer voluntarily participates in
either of the programs.
7  A trading system could be developed that allows firms to exploit dif-
ferences in relative environmental impacts, but it would be highly complex
and would involve a different trading ratio for each potential trade
(Shortle and Abler, 1997).66   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
If double-dipping is allowed, then the number of
permits available for sale equals the farm’s endow-
ment, r ˜i0 ' r ˆi0. The number of permits the farmer
has available for sale is essentially exogenous in
this case. We follow the convention of existing
programs and define farm i’s initial endowment of
permits as the expected loadings the farm would
produce in the absence of the trading program (i.e.,
the unregulated equilibrium),  ˆ ri0' E{ri(xu
i )}.
In existing and planned point-nonpoint trading
programs which include agricultural sources, farms
are not required to have permits. Instead, farms have
an implicit, initial right to pollute, which is con-
sistent with having permits equal to unregulated
expected loadings levels. Trading occurs as farms
contract with firms to reduce expected loadings in
exchange for a fee.
8 The ith farmer’s minimization
problem is defined by Vi after substituting in the











' 0 œ i, j.
If double-dipping is not allowed, then a farmer
cannot sell permits for reductions for which he/she
chooses to accept payment under the conservation
program, and vice versa. Assuming conservation
program choices are made first, a farmer has a choice
in allocating his/her initial permit endowment
between conservation payments and permit sales: the
number of permits available for sale to point sources
is endogenous and depends on the degree to which
farmers are willing to accept conservation payments.
Define to be the reduction in input x U
ij & x c
ij $ 0
use funded by the conservation program, with the
corresponding expected reduction of nonpoint loads
being In this case, the farmer is only ˆ ri0&E{ri(xc
i)}.
allowed to sell  permits to point ˜ ri0' E{ri(xc
i)}
sources under the trading program. Farm i’s net
costs are rewritten as:
Vi ' cri(xc








i & ˜ xi)} ,
where defines the additional reduc- ˜ xij' x
c
ij& xij$ 0
tion due to trading. Under this specification, the
farmer chooses both xi
c and x ˜i to minimize costs.
The first-order conditions (after substituting xij '
x
c
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Condition (7) is the standard condition for the type
of trading programs commonly analyzed in the ab-
sence of conservation programs (Horan et al., 2001).









Condition (8) is an arbitrage condition that states
the marginal value of reducing xij under the conser-
vation program should equal the marginal reduction
in revenues from permit sales due to a reduction in
the farm’s initial permit allocation.
We could also consider the case where the farmer
participates in the trading program first, a strategy
which would be followed if this yields greater net
benefits. The net cost function in this case is:
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due to the trading program. However, such a sit-
uation is not likely to arise if the conservation
incentives are sufficiently small relative to those of
the trading program. This is because the trading
program will lead to controls that raise farmers’
marginal control costs to levels whereby the costs
associated with additional controls may not be bal-
anced by the conservation subsidies. We assume this
is the case for simplicity and because agricultural
pollution remains the largest source of water quality
impairments even given existing conservation pay-
ments (USEPA, 2000), suggesting existing payments
8  Providing farmers with initial permits equal to their unregulated esti-
mated loadings does not affect the efficiency of the outcome as long as
this does not preclude the total number of permits from being set at an
efficient level, and as long as there is a sufficient mix of farmers so that
no farmer gains market power from his/her initial permit allocation. Also,
note that the qualitative results of our model would still hold if farmers’
initial permits were set equal to some level of regulated estimated load-
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are not set at levels that are providing substantial
improvements.
Coordinated Program Design and 
Economic Efficiency
We now consider the design of conservation and
trading programs assuming farmers participate in
both programs.
9 First, suppose there is no double-
dipping, in which case condition (7) holds. Without
double-dipping, the conservation program does not
affect farmers’ incentives for the last unit of pollu-
tion controlled.
10 Coordination is therefore of no
real consequence in this case. This is unimportant
if the trading program can bring about an efficient
outcome, which, by comparison of condition (7) to
the ex ante efficiency condition (1), only occurs if
the following condition holds:













where the superscript asterisks (*) indicate the vari-
ables are evaluated at their efficient values. Con-
dition (9) is in general overdetermined in {n × m}
equations in one unknown—no single value of pr
ensures this condition will be satisfied œ i, j (Shortle
and Dunn, 1986; Tietenberg, 1995). This is because
each input choice by each farm has a unique
marginal impact on expected damages, but a single
permit price does not provide differential incentives
for farmers to consider these different impacts [see
Horan, Shortle, and Abler (1998) and Shortle and
Dunn (1986) for more on incentives applied to
mean-based measures of environmental perform-
ance]. This result means efficiency cannot be
obtained when double-dipping is not allowed. The
inability to provide more efficient incentives through
policy coordination may therefore be an important
limitation of the no double-dipping case.
Now suppose double-dipping is allowed, in which
case condition (5) holds. Comparing condition (5)













With double-dipping, farmers’ incentives for the
final unit of pollution control [the right-hand side of
equation (10)] depend on both the subsidy and the
trading market. Equation (10) therefore implies the
conservation subsidies could in principle be set at
farm-specific levels to account for each farmer’s
unique marginal damage impacts to ensure an
efficient outcome for farms, regardless of the value
of pr. [Recall, the problem in the no double-dipping
case was that pr could not be set at farm-specific
rates to account for differential farm impacts; see
equation (9).]
This means there is some flexibility in choosing
the trading market policy parameters (t and the num-
ber of point source permits) given that the subsidy
can always be adjusted to yield the efficient out-
come. If a small trading ratio is chosen and/or if
total point source permits are ˆ e (where ˆ e ' Σ
s
k'1 ˆ ek)
limited so that pr is sufficiently large in equilibrium,
then most of the reductions are made due to the
trading program (since point sources have more
incentives to purchase nonpoint permits when t and
e ˆ are small) and the conservation subsidies can be
set at relatively small levels to fine-tune the distri-
bution. The result is that farms get paid twice for
the same actions, yet efficiency is promoted at a rel-
atively low cost to taxpayers. Of course, it remains
an issue as to whether conservation subsidies can
be set at farm-specific rates without the government
incurring excessive transactions costs.
Having said the trading parameters e ˆ and t can be
chosen to make pr sufficiently large, there has been
no discussion of how such choices will affect the
efficiency of point source pollution control efforts.
But by considering the dual to the trading problem,
we can see there is flexibility to make such choices.
A primal approach would be to directly choose t
and e ˆ, whereas the dual approach is to choose the
permit prices pe and pr. Viewed in this manner, pr can
be set sufficiently large to reduce government pay-
ments, and pe can be chosen to promote efficiency
among point sources. Firms will operate efficiently
if pe is set at the following level:
(11) p
(
e ' E DN(a() Ma(
Mek
œ k.
9  While an input subsidy program can be designed efficiently (Horan,
Shortle, and Abler, 1999), in which case there would be no need to
include farms in the trading program, there is no evidence that USDA
payments come close to efficient levels in practice. Because of this and
because our focus is on the combined impacts of these programs, we
ignore the degenerate case and only focus on farmer participation in both
programs.
10  If farmers participated in the trading program first, then the conser-
vation subsidies and not the trading program would affect farmers’
incentives for the last unit of pollution controlled.68   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
However, if firms’ emissions have differential mar-
ginal ambient impacts (note that efficiency does not
require otherwise), then condition (11) is over-
determined in s equations in one unknown—there
is no single value of pe that ensures this condition
will be satisfied œ k. Consequently, the trading
system cannot be first-best for firms because a
unique permit price does not provide firms with
differential incentives to consider the differential
marginal impacts of their emissions (Tietenberg,
1995). This inefficiency in the emissions market
can affect the level of control deemed optimal
among farms. But it does not affect the basic result
that coordination can increase the efficiency of




We now consider the more common scenario that
programs are not well coordinated. Assuming con-
servation policies are in place first, then trading
programs must be designed with this in mind (i.e.,
the sij’s are taken as given). The solution can only
be second-best, due to the limitations of trading as
described above. Using a dual approach, the trading
program is optimally designed by taking as given
the farms’ input and firms’ emissions demand
functions resulting from the firms’/farms’ first-order
conditions, and then choosing permit prices opti-
mally.
First, consider the case of no double-dipping.
Conditions (5) and (7) indicate the trading program
provides the same incentives as a trading program
implemented in the absence of conservation pro-
grams. Specifically, the last unit of nonpoint pollu-
tion control is based on the incentives provided by
the trading program—not the subsidy program. The
second-best permit prices, and hence trading ratio,
are therefore the same as those derived in Horan et
al. (2001) [see equation (12) below with sij set equal
to zero]. The only difference is that the aggregate
number of permits must be increased to offset the
reduction in loads due to the conservation pro-
gram.
11 Because the conservation program does not
influence the last unit of farmer controls when
double-dipping is not allowed, a well-targeted con-
servation program in this instance neither improves
efficiency nor increases farmer controls.
Now consider the case of double-dipping. Condi-
tions (1) and (4) define the input and emissions
demand functions xi(pr) and ek(pe), which are sub-
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Using the dual approach, the first-order necessary
conditions for an interior solution can be used in
combination with relations (3) and (7) to provide the















































































the solutions to (3), (7), the first-order conditions
for pe and pr, and the zero profit conditions defining
entry and exit, Vn ' 0 and Js ' 0.
12





1), the numerator of the expression for is the ex- p(
r
pected marginal social cost of input use in excess of
existing conservation subsidy rates, averaged across
all farms and inputs. The denominator is the expect-
ed marginal contribution of input use in loadings
production, averaged across all farms and inputs.
The averaging of impacts across all farms in equa-
tion (12) is a consequence of the restriction of 1:1
trading within the nonpoint source category, and
the averaging of impacts across all inputs is due to
the use of a loadings-based instrument rather than
11  Another difference is that if conservation programs induce substan-
tial nonpoint controls, then there will be little, if any, room left for trading
between point and nonpoint sources (since the initial allocation of non-
point permits is based on post-conservation expected loads). This out-
come is highly unlikely, however, given the historical size of agricultural
payments.
12  The regulatory agency will not be able to induce optimal entry and
exit when only permits are used, and the zero profit conditions are differ-
ent than the conditions the regulatory agency would optimally choose.Horan, Shortle, and Abler Point-Nonpoint Trading Programs and Agri-Environmental Policies   69
an input-based instrument for nonpoint sources. As
a result, the second-best price does not give (p
(
r )
farms incentives to exploit differences in their
relative marginal environmental impacts as would
a differentiated price system (i.e., one that emerges
from having differentiated trading ratios).
13
Interpreting ηk as a weight the (since Σ
s
k'1ηk'1),
emissions permit price equals the expected (p
(
e )
marginal social cost of emissions, averaged across
firms. The averaging of impacts across firms is
again a consequence of the restriction of 1:1 trading
within the point source category and implies cost-
increasing inefficiencies in the allocation of pollu-
tion control efforts. The inefficiencies occur because
pe
* does not give firms incentives to exploit differ-
ences in their relative marginal environmental im-
pacts, as a differentiated price system would.
As discussed above, the second-best trading ratio
is simply t ' pe
*/pr
*. A ratio of t ' 1 implies indiffer-
ence at the margin between the source of pollution
reduction. Ratios greater than one imply a high cost
of agricultural controls relative to firms’ controls,
and thus a preference for emissions reductions at the
margin. The reverse is true for ratios of less than
one. Clearly, the impact of the conservation subsi-
dies is to increase the trading ratio, making it more
expensive for firms to purchase expected loadings
reductions. This is because fewer nonpoint reduc-
tions are needed after the impact of the subsidies is
taken into account. The impact on the total number
of permits (e ˆ) is ambiguous, as are the efficiency
implications relative to the case with no double-
dipping.
It is not possible to analytically determine how
better targeting of input subsidies might affect the
second-best trading ratio in the double-dipping
scenario. Intuitively, however, it might be expected
that a greater reliance on input subsidies would be
desired relative to trading when input subsidies are
better targeted, which could result in a larger trading
ratio to discourage point source purchases of farm
loadings. We form this expectation because targeted
input subsidies have the potential to be more effi-
cient than a trading program involving 1:1 trading
within source categories and a uniform trading ratio.
Indeed, efficiently targeted input subsidies might be
expected to completely crowd out trading, although,
as described above, we do not view this case as real-
istic. In contrast, a greater reliance on trading might
be desired relative to the use of input subsidies
when input subsidies are not targeted, resulting in
a smaller trading ratio to encourage trading.
These expectations result from the fact that the
trading program, while nontargeted, is performance-
based. We might therefore expect that trading
provides better incentives for farmers to gauge the
impacts of their choices on performance than do the
nonperformance-based, nontargeted input subsidies.
These and other issues are examined further through
the use of a numerical example.
A Numerical Example
To gain further insight about the implications of
agri-environmental programs for the design of
trading programs, the gains from coordination, and
distributional outcomes, we present results from a
model of nitrogen pollution control from point
sources and agricultural nonpoint sources in the
Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) in Pennsylvania.
The Susquehanna is the 16th largest river in the
United States, comprises about 43% of the Chesa-
peake Bay watershed, and provides 50% of the
fresh water entering the Bay (Susquehanna River
Basin Commission, 1998). About 76% of the Sus-
quehanna’s 27.5 thousand square mile watershed is
located in Pennsylvania, occupying approximately
45% of the state, with smaller portions found in
Maryland and New York [Chesapeake Bay Program
(CBP), 2004].
Nutrient pollution is a major problem in the Bay,
and nitrogen is a major concern which has been the
focus of pollution control efforts over the past
several decades (CBP, 2004). The SRB is the major
source of nutrients entering the Bay, and agriculture
is by far the leading source of nitrogen (CBP, 2001;
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, 1996). Accordingly, reducing nitrogen loads
from agriculture as well as other point and nonpoint
sources is a major objective of state and federal
agencies with responsibilities for the Bay (CBP,
2004). Analogous to other regions of the nation,
point sources of nitrogen in the SRB have been
subject to stringent regulation, while agricultural
controls have largely been voluntary. And as in other
regions, there is growing interest in the use of trading
as a means to allocate nitrogen reductions from agri-
culture between point and nonpoint (CBP, 2004).
Our Susquehanna River Basin model is imple-
mented at a highly aggregate level [as opposed to
13  The degree to which this creates inefficiencies depends on the degree
of heterogeneity of marginal impacts and on correlations between key
environmental and cost relationships. Also, the second-best price, pr
*, also
does not give farms incentives to exploit differences in risk effects among
inputs. These issues are not discussed in further detail here, but interested
readers are referred to Horan et al. (2001).70   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Figure 1. Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) watersheds in Pennsylvania
modeling all 9,726 farms growing corn in the SRB
(Abler et al., 2002)] to capture essential features of
the economic problem without being overly cum-
bersome or costly to construct and compute. This
analysis considers eight SRB sub-watersheds (or
aggregations thereof) as defined by the Pennsyl-
vania Department of Environmental Protection for
water quality reporting and planning activities in
the SRB (see figure 1). For each sub-watershed, we
develop aggregate models of (a) agricultural pollu-
tion control costs for each region, (b) point source
pollution control costs for each region, (c) nutrient
delivery from each region to the Chesapeake Bay,
and (d) the economic damage costs of ambient nutri-
ent pollution in the Bay.
Farm Costs and Loadings
Nonpoint loads are assumed to be the result of corn
production (which also utilizes most manure
produced from livestock operations in the region),
modeled as a two-level, constant elasticity of scale
technology that exhibits constant returns to scale at
both levels (Sato, 1967). Following prior work
based on this approach (e.g., Kawagoe, Otsuka, and
Hayami, 1985; Thirtle, 1985; Binswanger, 1974),
aggregate production in the ith region, denoted yi,
is a function of a composite biological input, xiB,
and a composite mechanical input, xiM, i.e.:
yi' Ai αix
D 




where Ai and αi are parameters, and ρi ' (σi ! 1)/σi ,
where σi is the elasticity of substitution between the
biological and mechanical inputs. Similarly, xiB is
produced using land, xi1, and fertilizer, xi2:
xi B ' Ki βix
( 
i 1 % (1& βi)(µixi 2)
(  1/ ( ,
where Ki and βi are parameters, µi is the proportion
of nitrogen taken up by the plant, and γi ' (σBi ! 1)/
σBi, with σBi ' sBiσiL,N + sMiσi, where sj ( j'B, M) is
the cost share of the jth input in production, and
σiL,N is the elasticity of substitution between xi1 and
xi2. Because nitrogen is more or less a fixed propor-
tion of fertilizer, xi2 is denoted as nitrogen. The
mechanical input is produced using capital and
labor. Assuming the prices of these inputs are fixed,
there is no reason to further decompose xiM into its
constituent parts, as capital and labor will be used
in fixed proportions.
The price of corn, denoted p, is fixed and does
not vary within the watershed. The same is true of
the prices of nitrogen, w2, and the mechanical input,





where bi is a parameter, wi1 is the price of land, and
ηi is the elasticity of supply. Land supply reflects
the opportunity cost of this input, which differs in
each region. Given this specification, agricultural
sector control costs (i.e., foregone profits and land-
owner surplus) are:Horan, Shortle, and Abler Point-Nonpoint Trading Programs and Agri-Environmental Policies   71
cri(xi) ' pyi(x
U


















To calibrate the economic model in a realistic
fashion, we use cost share and production share data
for corn production in eight sub-watersheds of the
Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) in Pennsylvania
(USDA, 2000; Pennsylvania Agricultural Statistics
Service, 1998). For the parameters σi, σiL,N, µi, and
ηi, we adopt the mean of estimates reported in the
literature (σi ' 0.5, σiL,N ' 1.25, µi ' 0.7, and ηi '
0.3). See Horan, Shortle, and Abler (2002) for par-
ticular references and distributions of values reported
in the literature.
Region i’s loadings function is of the form




where Pi is precipitation, and rqi (q ' 1, 2, 3) are
parameters. Increases in nitrogen have a positive
impact on loadings (Mri/Mxi2 > 0), and so the sub-
sidy and trading programs optimally increase the
cost of nitrogen use. In contrast, increases in land
use (holding nitrogen use constant) have a negative
impact on loadings (Mri/Mxi1 < 0), and so the sub-
sidy and trading programs optimally decrease the
cost of land. The loadings functions are calibrated
from SRB data (Nizeyimana et al., 1997) and from
research results used to develop Total Maximum
Daily Load (TMDL) recommendations for Pennsyl-
vania. Precipitation is taken to be stochastic in our
simulation model and is assumed to be gamma
distributed with a mean and variance based on pre-
cipitation data for the regions. Another source of
uncertainty sometimes mentioned in the nonpoint
case is uncertainty regarding the effectiveness of
farm controls (i.e., in terms of our model, the coeffi-
cients r1i and r2i would be uncertain) (Malik, Letson,
and Crutchfield, 1993). This uncertainty may result
from a lack of experience with farm controls, but
over time it would presumably diminish. While this
study does not model this type of uncertainty expli-
citly, we acknowledge it could affect policy variables
in ways that allocate greater control to point sources
(Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993).
Firm Costs





where zi > 0 is a parameter, ζi < 0 is the elasticity of
costs with respect to emissions, and Fi is a fixed
cost. To ensure realism, the parameters are cali-
brated using data from a Susquehanna River Basin
Commission report (Edwards and Stoe, 1998). The
report provides base-level emissions (abatement)
for the most important point sources of nitrogen in
the SRB (primarily wastewater treatment facilities),
as well as costs for adopting various nutrient con-
trol technologies (e.g., three-stage annual treatment
and five-stage annual treatment), and the emissions
levels for each source under these technologies.
Data for these technologies and emissions levels
were aggregated to the regional level from indi-
vidual sources. Under this calibration, point sources
incur some control costs even before the trading
program is implemented, for instance in response to
previous pollution control legislation targeted only
at them. Our interests in their costs under a trading
program will largely focus around their increased
costs relative to what they incurred prior to the
trading program.
Nutrient Delivery
Loadings and emissions are defined as nutrients
entering into the sub-watershed in which they origi-
nate. However, only a fraction of the loadings or
emissions generated from each region is delivered
to become part of the ambient pollution concentra-
tion in the estuary, which is the chief area of concern
for policy purposes. Delivery generally depends on
deterministic factors such as distance from the estu-
ary and topography, and also stochastic processes
such as weather (see Smith, Schwarz, and Alexander,
1997). The proportion of the emissions/loads that is
delivered is modeled as a stochastic delivery coef-
ficient, ni, the realized value of which differs by
region and by source type within a particular region.








This relation represents a first-order approximation
to the actual delivery process, which is thought to
be reasonable in many cases (Roth and Jury, 1993).
The delivery coefficients are taken to be gamma
distributed, with the variances derived from results
of the U.S. Geological Survey SPARROW model
for the SRB (Smith, Schwarz, and Alexander, 1997).72   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
Table 1. Delivery Coefficient Distributions: Low and High Heterogeneity Models
Mean Delivery Coefficients










202   0.611 0.91 0.070
204   0.660 0.60 0.070
207   0.560 0.05 0.137
214   0.710 0.50 0.110
215   0.731 0.70 0.114
301S401   0.581 0.30 0.160
302   0.684 0.90 0.126
402   0.626 0.02 0.068
a See Pennsylvania map, figure 1, showing the eight Susquehanna River Basin sub-watersheds.
Two sets of means were used, however, to examine
the role of delivery coefficient heterogeneity across
regions. Without significant regional heterogeneity
in mean delivery coefficients, the restriction of 1:1
trading within source categories might be expected
to result in few, if any, inefficiencies because there
are few benefits from exploiting differences in the
marginal impacts of each source’s emissions/load-
ings. If this is so, the result would be that the
economic and environmental performance of the
economically efficient program and all the second-
best programs (i.e., targeted and nontargeted sub-
sidy programs, with or without double-dipping) will
tend to converge. Alternatively, greater divergence
in results might be expected when there is sig-
nificant regional heterogeneity of mean delivery
coefficients.
We therefore explore two alternative models:
high heterogeneity and low heterogeneity. Mean
delivery coefficients for the low heterogeneity
model are taken from SPARROW results for the
SRB, while mean delivery coefficients for the high
heterogeneity model are chosen randomly to ensure
significant heterogeneity (see table 1). Heterogeneity
can be measured by the coefficient of variation of
mean delivery coefficients across regions (i.e.,
standard deviation of mean delivery divided by aver-
age mean delivery across regions). The coefficient
of variation is 0.09 in the low heterogeneity model,
and 0.68 in the high heterogeneity model.
Economic Damages
Economic damages from pollution are a second-
order approximation of actual damages, which is
taken to be an increasing, convex function of a,
D(a) ' d1a + d2a
2. Smith (1992) relates ground-
water damages to the net benefits of agriculture.
We use such a relation to calibrate damages, setting
initial expected damages equal to 22.5% of unregu-
lated, private agricultural net benefits, and by
choosing an elasticity of damages equal to 1.6. The
percentage used to set initial expected damages is
slightly larger than values reported by Smith for
groundwater damages, but we are considering dam-
ages from both point and nonpoint sources (whereas
Smith only considered damages by agriculture).
The elasticity guarantees convex damages, and hence
social risk aversion with respect to pollution. This
will bias optimal trading ratios downward (Shortle,
1987; Malik, Letson, and Crutchfield, 1993). This
feature provides a nice contrast with our double-
dipping model in which we expect larger trading
ratios.
The Simulation Experiment
We examine the efficient outcome, as defined by
equations (1) and (2) (equivalent to optimal coordin-
ation), and four uncoordinated trading/conservation
subsidy scenarios: (a) targeted subsidies, no double-
dipping; (b) targeted subsidies, double-dipping;
(c) nontargeted subsidies, no double-dipping; and
(d) nontargeted subsidies, double-dipping. In each
case, the choices of trading program parameters, e ˆ
and t, depend on the level of the conservation subsi-
dies. It is assumed conservation subsidy rates for
the uncoordinated scenarios are chosen to minimize
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where ψ < 1 is a weight on expected damages. This
form of the objective function is chosen for two
reasons.
First, with expected damages receiving less
weight than private costs, the resulting subsidy
rates will be too low. This in turn leaves room for
gains from trading. This setup is also consistent with
a belief that current conservation payment rates are
not set at levels which can yield substantial envi-
ronmental gains, possibly reflecting a low weight
placed on environmental performance relative to
farm income and other considerations [see Rausser
and Foster (1991) for a discussion of rent-seeking
in agri-environmental programs].
14
Second, placing at least some weight on expected
damages allows subsidy rates in the targeted conser-
vation subsidy scenarios to be differentiated across
regions to reflect, at least to some extent, dif-
ferential marginal environmental impacts across
regions. Subsidy rates are applied uniformly across
regions in the nontargeted subsidy scenarios. Note
that because the uncoordinated conservation policy
objective is consistent with the trading authority’s
objective to minimize TSC, the gains from coor-
dination will be less than if the objectives were
conflicting.
The results are reported in table 2 for the high
heterogeneity and low heterogeneity models, with
ψ ' 0.33 in each case. All monetary results are pre-
sented as indices, which are used due to our interest
in the relative (as opposed to absolute) performance
of the trading programs and also to overcome some
scaling effects. The first column of results reports
an efficiency gain index. Efficiency gain (EG) for
a particular scenario is calculated as the percentage
reduction in expected social costs (TSC) relative to
the baseline data consisting of an unregulated
equilibrium for farms and some prior degree of





s represents expected social costs in
scenario s, and TSC
B represents baseline expected
social costs. The maximum potential efficiency gain
occurs in the efficient outcome. We therefore divide
each scenario’s efficiency gain by that of the effi-
cient outcome; hence, the efficiency gain index
(EGI) for the efficient outcome is 100. EGI values
below 100 represent the degree to which the poten-
tial efficiency gains have been achieved.
Columns [2] and [3] of table 2 present pollution
control costs to farms and firms, not including any
transfers due to subsidy receipts or permit sales/
purchases, i.e., the real resource costs associated with
pollution control. In each case, the values are indices,
with the numerator being control costs for the sce-
nario under consideration and the denominator being
the efficient level of control costs. Values greater
than 100 imply over-control relative to the efficient
level, while values less than 100 imply under-control.
Columns [4] and [5] report results for farm sub-
sidy receipts and farm permit sales revenues. In each
14  An alternative approach is for the USDA to minimize total social
costs subject to a budget constraint. If USDA had a fixed budget constraint
for subsidy programs, then the problem would turn into a game between
the USDA, farmers, and the EPA: USDA would have to set its subsidy
rates conditional on expectations about farmer responses to both the con-
servation and trading programs in order to estimate whether the budget
constraint would be satisfied. This would introduce a strategic component
into the problem that would be interesting to analyze in a separate study
but is beyond the scope of the current paper.74   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
case, the values are indices, with the numerator
being farm receipts/revenues for the scenario under
consideration and the denominator being farm
control costs for the scenario under consideration.
Values represent the percentage of control costs that
are covered by the receipts/revenues, with values
greater than 100 indicating the receipts/revenues
more than cover control costs, and values less than
100 indicating control costs are not covered. These
two columns are additive, and in each case the sum
is greater than 100, which must be the case for farms
to voluntarily reduce their pollution under these two
programs.
The final two columns in table 2 represent opti-
mal choices of the trading program parameters for
each scenario. The trading ratio (column [6]) is
presented in absolute terms, not as an index. Total
permits (column [7]) are represented as an index,
with the numerator being the total permits (denom-
inated in terms of emissions) for the scenario, and
the denominator being total initial emissions and
loads (denominated in terms of emissions, using the
optimal trading ratio for the scenario at hand to
convert loads to emissions).
The overall pattern of results is the same for the
high heterogeneity (HH) and low heterogeneity
(LH) models, with program efficiency differences
being more pronounced in the high heterogeneity
model [recall, the double-dipping (DD) and no
double-dipping (NDD) scenarios would both be
efficient if there were no heterogeneity in delivery
coefficients].
First, consider the targeted scenarios. In both
models, the DD scenario produced greater effici-
ency gains than the NDD scenario, although the
degree of difference depends largely on the hetero-
geneity of delivery coefficients. The DD scenario is
more efficient because this scenario provides
farmers with targeted incentives, where the final
unit of pollution controlled depends on the incen-
tives provided by both the subsidies and the permit
market. In contrast, the NDD scenario does not
provide targeted incentives because the final unit of
control is governed only by incentives created by
the permit market. Better targeting of farm controls
under DD results in smaller expected damages rela-
tive to NDD. Cost savings due to a more efficient
allocation of controls makes up the rest of the dif-
ference in economic net benefits between the two
scenarios. This cost savings effect is easiest to
observe in the HH model, where better targeting
under DD results in lower control costs for both
farms and firms—with farms incurring proportion-
ately lower costs relative to NDD. The improved
targeting of farm controls is also evidenced by
fewer permits under the DD scenario. This is in
spite of the fact that, under the NDD scenario, farms
have initial permit allocations equal to their pre-
trade but post-conservation expected loads.
Still focusing on targeted scenarios, consider the
payments farmers receive to reduce their loads.
Subsidy receipts are approximately six times larger
under DD than under NDD in each model. This
occurs because, under DD, the combination of the
two programs induces farmers to provide more
environmental benefits under DD, and the subsidies
must pay for these additional benefits.
15 But even
with substantially larger subsidy payments under
DD, the total payments received by farmers are less
than 6.5% larger under DD than NDD. This is
because the trading program is optimally adjusted
in response to the subsidy payments farmers receive
for the same pollution reductions. Specifically, the
trading ratio is less than one under the NDD
scenario, as is consistent with theory given our
specification for risk (Shortle, 1990; Malik, Letson,
and Crutchfield, 1993; Horan et al., 2001). How-
ever, the trading ratio is greater than one under the
DD scenario. The larger trading ratio under DD
makes it more expensive for firms to purchase load-
ings reductions, reducing the equilibrium price farms
receive for permits. But farms are willing to sell
their permits for a lower price because their abate-
ment efforts are also subsidized by USDA, yielding
a targeted reduction in the opportunity cost of abate-
ment by nonpoint sources.
The net result is that firms spend less on loadings
reductions under the DD scenario. In fact, the larger
total subsidy received by farmers under DD is
almost entirely offset by reduced permit revenues,
so that farmers have only a slight to moderate
preference for DD. Firms, however, have a much
stronger preference for the DD scenario. Their
control costs are almost identical under DD and
NDD, but their loadings permit expenditures are
much larger under NDD. Specifically, after
accounting for the different bases in the index
values of permit sales, our findings indicate firms’
expenditures on loadings permits are more than
15  The difference in subsidies between DD and NDD is diminished as
the weight on expected damages is reduced. For instance, if we were to
reduce the weight on expected damages to 10% when calculating subsidy
rates, then for the nontargeted programs DD would still be more effi-
cient—but the difference in the subsidy index between DD and NDD is
cut to approximately 11.2 (compared to a 45.6 difference when a 33%
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30% larger under NDD in the LH model and more
than 54% larger under NDD in the HH model.
Because farms are no better off from the larger
subsidies they receive under DD, while firms are
better off, we conclude that the extra subsidy pay-
ments which arise under DD are effectively trans-
ferred to firms under an optimally designed trading
program.
Now consider the nontargeted scenario. The
NDD scenario is more efficient than the DD
scenario when the conservation policies are not
targeted. The reason is, under the NDD scenario,
the permit market provides performance-based
incentives for the final unit of agricultural pollution
control—that is, farmers have incentives to gauge
the impacts of their choices on performance. In
contrast, under the DD scenario, both (nontargeted)
subsidies and the permit market provide incentives
for the final unit of agricultural pollution control.
Consequently, the permit market provides fewer
incentives in the DD scenario because the subsidies
make up the difference. This reduced reliance on
the trading program to provide incentives reduces
the efficiency of the DD scenario relative to the
NDD scenario. This is because the trading program
provides better incentives for farmers to gauge the
impacts of their choices on performance than do the
nonperformance-based, nontargeted input subsidies.
So, whereas targeted input subsidies improve the
relative efficiency of the NDD scenario (because
targeted input subsidies are more efficient than
trading when there is 1:1 trading within source
categories and a uniform trading ratio), nontargeted
subsidies reduce the relative efficiency of the NDD
scenario.
Upon considering the payments farmers receive
to reduce their loads in the nontargeted scenarios,
subsidy receipts are approximately five times larger
and permit sale revenues significantly lower under
DD than under NDD in each model. This result is
consistent with those of the targeted scenarios and
for the same reasons. Also consistent with the tar-
geted scenarios, and for essentially the same reasons,
the total payments received by farmers are less than
6.5% larger under DD than NDD. As with the
targeted scenarios, the net result is that firms spend
less on loadings reductions under the DD scenario.
Again, firms clearly prefer the DD scenario,
although not as strongly as under the targeted
scenarios. After accounting for the different bases
in the index values of permit sales, findings show
that firms’ expenditures on loadings permits are
only about 9.5% lower under DD in each model, as
compared to a 30S50% difference in the targeted
scenarios. Firms clearly benefit the most from DD
when subsidies are targeted.
Based on the results reported in table 2, farms
are slightly better off in each model under a non-
targeted approach, regardless of whether double-
dipping occurs. But the same is not so for firms.
Firms are slightly better off under NDD when
subsidies are not targeted, but they are significantly
better off under DD when subsidies are targeted.
Nontargeted DD ratios are lower than the targeted
DD ratios, for roughly the same number of permits.
This means firms face greater incentives to pur-
chase nonpoint reductions in the nontargeted DD
program relative to the targeted DD program. As
described above, the reason is that the trading
program provides better incentives for farmers to
gauge the impacts of their choices on performance
when input subsidies are not targeted, while the
opposite is true when input subsidies are targeted.
Accordingly, it makes economic sense to utilize
trading to a greater degree when input subsidies
are not targeted, and to utilize the input subsidies
to a greater degree when they are targeted (imply-
ing less need for trading). The relative utilization
of the two programs affects the degree of income
transfer farmers receive from subsidies and trad-
ing, with firms funding a much larger proportion
of farm controls under DD when subsidies are
not targeted.
Finally, consider the impacts to taxpayers, which
can be seen by their level of subsidy payments.
Taxpayers are better off under NDD relative to DD,
because under NDD taxpayers do not have to pay
for loadings reductions that firms are willing to pay
for. Taxpayers are also better off when subsidies
are nontargeted. As described above, this is because
the trading program is utilized to a greater extent
when subsidies are not targeted, transferring more
of the financial burden of paying for loadings
reductions to firms.
Conclusions
Input-based payments to improve the environ-
mental performance of agriculture have long been
of interest and have been implemented in various
forms by the federal and state governments
(Ribaudo, 2001). In general, the water quality gains
from these programs have not been large, as agri-
culture remains a leading cause of water quality
impairments (Ribaudo, 2001). Recently, there
has been growing interest in and use of pollution76   April 2004 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
trading to reduce nonpoint source pollution from
agriculture and other nonpoint sources of pollution,
and to improve the efficiency of the allocation of
pollution load reductions between point and non-
point sources. While there has been much research
on the design of stand-alone input-based incentives
and point-nonpoint trading schemes (Shortle and
Horan, 2002), the joint implementation of these
mechanisms has received little formal attention.
In this analysis, we have studied a mixture of
these policies. The mixture involves (a) input-based
agri-environmental payments that are offered at
levels which can produce some efficiency gains but
are insufficient to achieve an efficient outcome, and
(b) point-nonpoint trading. This mixture is analo-
gous to the existing policy setting in which agricul-
tural agencies are offering agri-environmental
payments that are inadequate to achieve water
quality goals, with state water quality agencies
considering additional mechanisms to achieve the
needed pollution reductions. We consider both tar-
geted and nontargeted agri-environmental payment
schemes, but have no spatial targeting of the trading
program. The analysis examines both the coor-
dinated and noncoordinated use of these policies. In
the noncoordinated case, it is assumed the agri-
environmental payments are already in place and
the trading authority takes these into account when
designing the trading program.
Policies administered by different agencies are
not usually perfect substitutes, but rather may be
complementary or competing. In the setting we ex-
amine, the combined performance of these policies,
both for the coordinated and noncoordinated cases,
is better than when each program is administered
individually. Hence, these policies are complemen-
tary in nature. The degree of improved performance
depends on whether the programs are coordinated
or not, whether double-dipping is allowed, whether
the agri-environmental payments are targeted, and
whether there is enough heterogeneity in the system
to take advantage of targeted payments.
Coordinating the mechanisms can only provide
economic efficiency gains (relative to noncoordina-
tion of the jointly implemented policies) when the
two programs jointly influence farmers’ decisions
about the last unit of pollution controlled. We
demonstrate that this can only occur under double-
dipping—i.e., when the farmer can be paid twice
(once by each program) for undertaking a particular
combination of pollution control actions.
When the programs are not coordinated and agri-
environmental payments are lower than what is
required for efficiency in a stand-alone setting, then
double-dipping may either increase or decrease the
efficiency of pollution control allocations, with the
result depending on the targeting of the input pay-
ments. Double-dipping increases efficiency if the
input-based policies are well-targeted. This is
because, through double-dipping, the marginal
incentives provided by the programs are combined,
with farmers receiving targeted incentives which
are closer to efficient levels than would occur under
either program individually. Farmers and point
sources are also better off under double-dipping in
the well-targeted case. In fact, double-dipping
results in a transfer of much of the agricultural sub-
sidies to point sources, provided the trading program
is optimally designed.
If the input-based policies are not well-targeted,
then the trading program provides better incentives,
since it is performance-based. In this case, efficiency
is improved by prohibiting double-dipping so that
farmers only face performance-based incentives for
their marginal choices. Double-dipping may result in
a substantially higher income transfer to farmers in
this case, but at the expense of point sources.
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